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Insider Ownership and Financial Analysts' Information Environment: 
Evidence from Dual-Class Firms 
Abstract 
We examine the association of insider ownership with financial analysts' forecast accuracy and 
dispersion in a sample of U.S. dual class firms. Insider ownership exerts two effects: a positive 
incentive and a negative entrenchment effect. The lack of significant findings in prior research 
regarding the association between insider ownership and forecast accuracy may be attributable to 
the offsetting forces of these two effects. Using a comprehensive hand-collected sample of U.S. 
firms that maintain more than one class of common stock, we are able to disentangle incentive 
and entrenchment effects which are confounded in single-class firms. We find that 
disproportionate insider control is negatively associated with forecast accuracy and positively 
associated with forecast dispersion. Moreover, insider cash flow rights (insider voting rights) are 
positively (negatively) associated with forecast accuracy and negatively (positively) associated 
with forecast dispersion, consistent with incentive-alignment and entrenchment effects of 
ownership affecting financial analysts’ forecasting environment in opposite directions.  
I. Introduction 
This study examines the association of insider ownership with financial analysts’ forecast 
accuracy and forecast dispersion. Prior work on the effects of firms' ownership structure and 
forecast accuracy (Byard, Li, & Weintrop, 2006; Ljungqvist, Marston, Starks, Wei, & Yan, 
2007; García-Meca & Sánchez-Ballesta, 2011) documents that institutional ownership 
significantly affects forecast accuracy, but does not establish a significant link between insider 
ownership and forecast accuracy. This is puzzling, because insider ownership has been 
recognized as an important aspect of firms' overall corporate governance structure (e.g., Harris & 
Raviv, 1988; La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, & Vishny, 2000; Singh & Davidson, 2003). 
Insider ownership can help align the interests of management and shareholders, but at the same 
time it provides management with a means of entrenchment (Morck, Shleifer, & Vishny, 1988; 
Duellman, Ahmed, & Abdel-Meguid, 2013). We posit that the non-significant findings in prior 
work may be due to these peculiar counteracting effects conveyed by insider ownership.  
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To disentangle the incentive and entrenchment effects of ownership, we therefore follow 
prior studies (Francis, Schipper, & Vincent, 2005; Masulis, Wang, & Xie, 2009; Gompers, Ishii, 
& Metrick, 2010, hereinafter: GIM) that focus on a set of companies with unique characteristics: 
firms with more than one class of common stock.1 Unlike in firms with a single class of common 
stock, cash flow rights and voting rights owned by insiders tend not to be identical in dual-class 
firms. This unique feature of dual-class firms allows us to separately assess how incentive- 
alignment effects of insider ownership (from cash flow rights) and entrenchment effects of 
ownership (from voting rights) affect financial analysts’ forecast accuracy and dispersion. 
Moreover, we are also able to examine how disproportionate insider control, measured as the 
excess of insider voting rights over their cash flow rights, commonly referred to as "wedge" 
(GIM, 2010), affects financial analysts’ forecast properties.  
We expect disproportionate insider control to be negatively associated with financial 
analysts' information environment for two interconnected reasons. First, managerial 
entrenchment may be associated with reduced credibility of the accounting information available 
to market participants (Francis et al., 2005). Less credible accounting information can generate 
uncertainty in analysts’ information environment (Barniv & Cao, 2009) and therefore trigger less 
accurate analyst earnings forecasts. Second, concentrated ownership by insiders may stem from 
insiders’ desire to operate in greater secrecy, which results in tighter control of the information 
flow from the corporation to external users (Fan & Wong, 2002).  
                                                 
1 Traditionally dual-class firms have been a popular choice among firms with family-ownership roots (DeAngelo & 
DeAngelo, 1985; Field & Karpoff, 2002; Villalonga & Amit, 2009). A dual-class structure allows founders to 
benefit from going public and opening corporate ownership to outsiders, while maintaining control of the firm. 
Dual-class firms are also common among firms in which non-financial benefits of control are important, such as the 
ability to influence publication policies for firms operating in the media industry (Demsetz & Lehn, 1985; DeAngelo 
& DeAngelo, 1985). Recently, many high-profile technology firms have adopted a dual-class structure.  
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However, we note that a negative effect of disproportionate insider control on the quality 
of financial information is not unambiguous. For instance, Nguyen & Xu (2010) and Chen 
(2008) present evidence of a lower instance of earnings management in dual-class firms. Because 
entrenched insiders are less dependent on the good will of shareholders, they may have less 
reason to conceal or manage financial information. While this rationale suggests possibly higher 
quality information, for the same reason the quantity of information supplied may be lowered, 
because entrenched insiders may have lowered incentives to provide timely and/or 
comprehensive information to their outside shareholders. On the whole, we therefore believe that 
disproportionate insider control likely is negatively associated with financial analysts' 
information environment. 
We begin our examination by developing a new hand-collected sample of dual-class 
firms from 2000 to 2012 largely following the approach of GIM (2010). That is, we first build a 
comprehensive list of potential dual-class firms identified from several sources, and then check 
all candidates to determine if the firm actually has a dual-class structure of shares. Through these 
procedures, we are confident to present a sample which approaches the population of public 
dual-class firms in the U.S. during this time period.2 Our focus on dual-class firms potentially 
introduces a sample selection bias into our analysis, since the sample of firms we study is not 
randomly selected from the population of U.S. public firms. In addition, like most studies of 
companies’ ownership structure or governance characteristics, endogeneity may affect the 
interpretability of our results. To address these concerns, we employ two-stage regressions that 
control for sample selection bias, following the Heckman (1979) methodology, and endogeneity, 
in addition to our single-stage regressions. 
                                                 
2 In total, we identify 530 unique dual-class firms that contribute a total of 3,523 firm-years. Upon merging our dual-
class sample with necessary data from Compustat, I/B/E/S, and Thomson Reuters the number of observations in our 
main analyses is 2,050 (356 unique firms). 
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Across all three approaches, we find a significant negative relationship of 
disproportionate insider control and analysts’ forecast accuracy. Likewise, insider voting rights 
are negatively associated with forecast accuracy, while insider cash flow rights show a positive 
association. Consistent with our results for accuracy, we also find that disproportionate insider 
control is positively associated with the dispersion of earnings forecasts. Increased dispersion 
indicates greater uncertainty and lower consensus among analysts (Imhoff & Lobo, 1992; Barron 
& Stuerke, 1998; Barron, Kim, Lim, & Stevens, 1998) and a poorer information environment 
(Byard, Li, & Yu, 2011). The association of insider voting rights (cash flow rights) with forecast 
dispersion is correspondingly positive (negative). All of these results are robust across different 
forecast horizons, model specifications, and a number of additional robustness tests, for instance, 
controlling for firms’ private benefits capacity and reverse causality. In addition, we find results 
consistent with our levels models for a changes (first differences) model which demonstrates that 
contemporaneous and lagged changes in disproportionate control are positively (negatively) 
associated with changes in analysts’ forecast dispersion (accuracy). 
Taken together, our findings add to prior work by establishing that insider ownership 
does have a bearing on financial analysts’ forecast accuracy and forecast dispersion. However, 
the association is a product of counteracting elements of ownership. While incentive-alignment 
effects of ownership have a positive impact, entrenchment effects of ownership exercise a force 
in the opposite direction. For this reason, perhaps, prior work (Byard et al., 2006; García-Meca & 
Sánchez-Ballesta, 2011) was unable to discern an effect of insider ownership on financial 
analysts on average. Our results suggest that insider ownership influences the information 
environment of firms and provide further evidence of the importance of considering insider 
ownership in understanding firm and analyst behavior.  
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In the following Section II, we discuss the related literature and develop our research 
hypotheses. We describe our data and research design in Section III. Section IV presents 
empirical results. Concluding remarks appear in Section V.  
II. Literature Review and Hypothesis Development 
The question of the impact of insider ownership on the forecasting environment of 
financial analysts is largely open in the literature. Only a few studies to date examine the 
association between insider ownership and financial analysts' forecast accuracy and dispersion. 
Byard et al. (2006) do not discern a statistically significant effect of CEO or director ownership 
on the accuracy of financial analysts' forecasts in a sample of U.S. firms. Similarly, García-Meca 
& Sánchez-Ballesta (2011) do not find that insider ownership, defined as board of director 
ownership, significantly affects financial analysts' forecast errors using a sample of Spanish 
firms. In a related study, Haw, Ho, Hu, & Wu (2010) on average also do not detect a significant 
effect of the divergence between the controlling owner’s control and cash flow rights on forecast 
accuracy and dispersion in a sample of East Asian and Western European firms.3  
Given the influence of insiders on the quality and quantity of firms’ mandatory and 
voluntary financial reporting, this lack of significant findings is surprising. However, the 
difficulty in demonstrating the influence of insider ownership on analysts’ forecasting 
environment may stem from the nature of ownership itself. Insider ownership exerts two distinct 
forces. On one hand, insider ownership mitigates the classic agency conflict between owners and 
                                                 
3 Haw et al. (2010) examine the divergence of control and cash flow rights of the controlling owner regardless of the 
identity of the controlling owner. The controlling owner may be the founding family, as is common in Asian 
countries, a financial institution, another corporation, or the firm could be state-owned. The authors caution that this 
mix of identities of the controlling owner may have affected their results, because incentives to exploit excess 
control rights for personal gain, or to manipulate firms’ disclosure practices to this end, are likely not constant across 
different types of controlling owners.  
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managers of the firm by aligning interests of outside shareholders and those in charge of 
managing the firm. This incentive-alignment effect should result in increased informativeness of 
mandatory financial reporting as managers' incentives to manipulate earnings for private benefits 
are reduced (Warfield, Wild, & Wild, 1995; Wang, 2006; Duellman et al., 2013). A positive 
association of managerial ownership with the extent of voluntary disclosures, documented for 
instance by Nasir & Abdullah (2004) in Malaysia, also supports positive incentive-alignment 
effects. Because the incentive-alignment effects of ownership provide insiders with incentives 
for improved quality and quantity of financial information, insider ownership may therefore 
exert positive effects on the information environment of financial analysts. 
On the other hand, increasing levels of insider ownership may result in an entrenchment 
effect. High insider ownership reduces the threat of an ouster, and may enable corporate insiders 
to influence financial reporting and firm disclosure practices according to their self-interest 
(Lang, Lins, & Miller, 2004; Baik, Kang, & Morton, 2010). Insider ownership thus can create a 
Type II agency conflict between controlling and minority shareholders, where controlling 
shareholders may use their influence in the firm to extract perquisites at the cost of minority 
shareholders (Villalonga & Amit, 2009). Accordingly, users may place less credence in the 
accounting information produced by firms with high levels of insider ownership (Fan & Wong, 
2002). The credibility of accounting information, however, has been shown to be positively 
associated with its informativeness (Teoh & Wong, 1993), and less credible accounting 
information can generate uncertainty in analysts’ information environment (Barniv & Cao, 
2009). Moreover, as insider ownership increases, insiders are also able to operate with greater 
discretion and to exercise tighter control over the flow of information (Fan & Wong, 2002). 
Specifically, concentrated ownership allows insiders to better manage who possesses information 
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in the organization, and thereby to better guard against information leakage.4 For these reasons, 
greater levels of insider ownership could decrease the informativeness of financial reporting, and 
the quality and quantity of firm voluntary disclosure.  
In sum, theory and prior research therefore suggest that insider ownership may improve 
or diminish the quality of financial analysts' information environment, depending on whether 
incentive or entrenchment effects dominate. Yet typically these effects are confounded. The two 
separate forces—incentives and entrenchment—must be identified using only one variable: 
insider share ownership. We posit that prior studies potentially did not discern an association of 
insider ownership with financial analysts' forecast accuracy due to the countervailing effects of 
these two forces. 
An analysis of dual-class companies offers a way around this problem. In a typical firm 
with a dual-class equity structure, one class of common stock has more votes per share than the 
other, while both classes generally have similar cash flow rights. The equity structure of dual-
class firms therefore breaks the link between voting rights, which proxy for the entrenchment 
effect, and cash flow rights, which proxy for the incentive-alignment effect of ownership. By 
creating a material difference between the proportion of voting rights and cash-flow rights held, 
insiders are able to exert disproportionate control; insiders do not bear the economic 
consequences of their actions pro rata with their level of control over the firm.  
Several studies examine how disproportionate insider control affects aspects of financial 
reporting quality. Francis et al. (2005) document that the informativeness of earnings, as 
                                                 
4 We note that choosing higher levels of insider ownership to increase the ability to operate in greater secrecy must 
not necessarily be motivated by entrenchment, but can reflect a legitimate interest to more effectively guard 
sensitive information. Consistent with the latter explanation, Chemmanur, Paeglis, & Simonyan (2011) for instance 
provide evidence that firms may adopt strong anti-takeover measures, such as a dual-class structure of stock, to 
enable management’s long-term focus on value creation. However, regardless of whether tighter information control 
is used as a means of entrenchment, or to more strictly guard proprietary information, the information environment 
of financial analysts will likely be less rich.  
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indicated by the returns-earnings relationship, decreases as disproportionate insider control 
increases in a sample of U.S. dual-class firms. Fan & Wong (2002) present similar results and 
show that a separation of voting rights from cash flow rights, accomplished through cross-
holdings and pyramid structures common in Asian economies, reduces earnings informativeness. 
Using samples of East Asian and Western European countries, the divergence of control from 
cash flow rights of the ultimate owner has also been shown to be positively associated with 
accruals based earnings management (Haw, Hu, Hwang, & Wu, 2004), classification shifting 
(Haw, Ho, & Li, 2011), and lowered earnings conservatism (Lim & Tan, 2009). 
These findings in the literature strongly suggest that disproportionate insider control 
negatively affects the information environment of analysts. However, a few studies also suggest 
otherwise. For instance, because entrenched insiders are less beholden to shareholders, they have 
less reason to conceal or manage financial information. Pleasing investors by meeting earnings 
benchmarks matters less when insiders have enhanced influence over their compensation and job 
security. Consistent with this conjecture, Nguyen & Xu (2010) find that earnings management 
activities are associated positively with managerial cash flow rights, but negatively with 
managerial voting rights. Chen (2008) similarly finds lower earnings management in dual-class 
compared to single-class firms, but explains the finding with decreased capital-market pressure 
on entrenched managers who can focus on long-term value creation and hence have lowered 
incentives for short-term earnings manipulation.  
While a lower concern about earnings may help earnings quality by reducing incentives 
for manipulation, the same lowered concern should in general reduce incentives to provide 
timely and/or comprehensive information to shareholders. That is, while the quality of some 
financial information may be higher, by the same logic the quantity of information supplied 
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should be lower. Indeed, Tinaikar (2014) documents that the separation of voting and cash flow 
rights in dual-class firms is negatively associated with firms’ voluntary compensation 
disclosures. 
Overall, we therefore expect that disproportionate insider control is negatively associated 
with financial analysts' information environment. Further, we expect the incentive-alignment 
effects of ownership, which capture the sharing in the economic success of the firm through 
insider cash flow rights, to exercise a force towards higher quality information. Conversely, the 
entrenchment effect, which captures the extent to which insiders are isolated from the control by 
outside shareholders through insider voting rights, exerts a negative influence on financial 
analysts’ information environment. When the information supplied to financial analysts is of 
inferior quality, analysts will tend to make less accurate forecasts (Lang & Lundholm, 1996; 
Hope, 2003). Accordingly, we hypothesize: 
H1a:  Disproportionate insider control is negatively associated with the accuracy 
of financial analysts' earnings forecasts. 
H1b:  Insider voting rights (insider cash flow rights) are negatively (positively) 
associated with the accuracy of financial analysts' earnings forecasts. 
We similarly expect forecast dispersion to vary with the quality of the information 
environment. Forecast dispersion has been found to be associated with greater levels of 
information asymmetry (Lang & Lundholm, 1996; Barron & Stuerke, 1998; Irani & Karamanou, 
2003) as well as a less-rich information environment (Byard et al., 2011). Further, Barron, 
Byard, Kile, & Riedl (2002) demonstrate that when financial information is less useful for 
predicting firm performance, the information contained in forecasts of individual analysts will 
tend to consist more of private knowledge than common knowledge. Accordingly, to the extent 
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that the divergence of voting rights from cash flow rights reduces overall information quality, 
financial analysts will rely more on idiosyncratic information. Because dispersion reflects 
idiosyncratic error arising from reliance on private information (Barron et al., 1998), we 
hypothesize with respect to forecast dispersion: 
H2a:  Disproportionate insider control is positively associated with the 
dispersion of financial analysts' earnings forecasts. 
H2b:  Insider voting rights (insider cash flow rights) are positively (negatively) 
associated with the dispersion of financial analysts' earnings forecasts. 
III. Data and Research Methodology 
Sample 
We construct a sample of U.S. dual-class firms from 2000 to 2012 following the 
approach of GIM (2010). That is, we first build a comprehensive list of potential dual-class firms 
from sources identified in GIM (2010).5 We eliminate foreign and financial firms. For all 
remaining candidates, we access proxy statements and/or 10-Ks on the SEC’s EDGAR database 
to verify the corporate structure and to determine insider ownership for each class of stock in 
every year.6 We follow GIM (2010) in defining insider ownership comprehensively and include 
shares owned by family members, or trusts for the benefit of family members, as well as shares 
owned by parent or subsidiary corporations with board representation.7 We also collect dividend 
data since classes of shares may not only differ with respect to voting, but also with respect to 
                                                 
5 In addition, we include as candidates all firms reported as dual-class in the GIM (2010) sample, which spans 1995 
to 2002. We thank Paul Gompers, Joy Ishii, and Andrew Metrick for generously sharing their list of dual-class 
companies underlying GIM (2010).  
6 Current SEC reporting requirements mandate firms to disclose the share ownership for each director as well as for 
all officers and directors as a group. We define corporate insiders as this disclosed group of officers and directors. 
7 The SEC-required ownership disclosures include options, warrants, deferred shares, and other "rights to stock" 
exercisable within 60 days of the date of disclosure. No distinction is made if such options are "in the money" and 
therefore likely to result in future ownership, or not. To maintain a clean measure of actual voting and cash flow 
rights owned by insiders, we screen the disclosures and compute ownership excluding all options and other rights. 
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their dividend rights. At this stage, we also collect governance characteristics included as 
controls: CEO-Chairman identity, board size, and number of independent directors. Through 
these procedures, we are confident to present a high-quality, comprehensive sample which likely 
approaches the population of U.S. non-financial dual-class firms in our sample period. Upon 
merging our dual-class data with Compustat, I/B/E/S, and Thomson Reuters, our final sample 
consists of 2,050 firm-years, representing 356 unique firms.8 
Insider voting and cash flow rights 
In companies with multiple classes of common stock, separate classes of shares may 
entitle their holders to a different number of votes per share and/or different dividend rights. 
Differences in the number of votes per share are the primary mechanism of creating a divergence 
between voting rights and cash flow rights in dual-class firms. A second control-enhancing 
mechanism is disproportionate board representation (Villalonga & Amit, 2009). We define 
insider voting rights (VR) as board election rights, i.e., the proportion of board seats insiders are 
able to command, regardless if this voting power stems from differences in the number of votes 
per share, from disproportionate board representation rights, or from both sources.9 We compute 
insider cash flow rights (CFR) as fractional equity ownership, i.e., the percentage of shares held 
by corporate insiders to shares outstanding of all classes, weighted by dividend rights per class 
(Francis et al., 2005; GIM, 2010). Our primary measure of disproportionate insider control is the 
ratio of insider voting rights to insider cash flow rights (WEDGE).10 
                                                 
8 We follow Horton, Serafeim, & Serafeim (2013) in choosing the consensus forecast that is calculated three months 
before the end of the reporting period as our base line. The sizes of our samples for alternate forecast horizons vary 
between 2,026 and 2,247 firm-years due to different number of forecasts available at different horizons. 
9 While infrequent, some companies differentiate voting rights according to the subject matter to be voted on. For 
instance, equal voting rights may exist for regular business, such as the confirmation of the auditor, but one class 
may have more votes per share when voting on takeover proposals or in the election of directors. 
10 The divergence of VR from CFR can be expressed as the ratio or difference of the two. The difference and ratio 
both have been used in prior work. We use the ratio of VR to CFR as our primary metric (Masulis et al., 2009) and 
examine the robustness of our results to using the difference as an alternate specification.  
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Research design 
We measure our two dependent variables, analysts’ forecast accuracy (ACC) and forecast 
dispersion (DISP), similar to Duru & Reeb (2002) and Byard et al. (2006). Specifically, we 
compute ACC as the absolute value of the difference between the mean I/B/E/S consensus 
forecast of annual earnings and the actual annual earnings reported by I/B/E/S, scaled by stock 
price on the day prior to the measurement of the I/B/E/S consensus forecast.11 For ease of 
interpretation we multiply this scaled forecast error by -1, so that higher values of ACC indicate 
higher accuracy. DISP is the standard deviation of analysts’ forecasts scaled by stock price on 
the day prior to the measurement of the I/B/E/S consensus forecast. Following Byard et al. 
(2011), we require that a minimum of two analysts are included in the computation of the 
consensus forecast to ensure that dispersion is meaningful.12 
In addition to our variable(s) of interest, we include controls for firm, forecast, and 
corporate governance characteristics in our primary model: 
ACC (DISP)it =  β0 + β1WEDGEit + β2lnSIZEit + β3LOSSit + β4EPS_VOLit + 
β5HORIZONit + β6FOLLOWit + β7CEO_CHAIRit + β8BOARD_SIZEit + 
β9IND_DIRit + β10INST_OWNit + βkYEARit + βjINDUSTRYit + ε (1) 
A negative (positive) coefficient on the independent variable of interest, WEDGE, the 
extent of divergence of voting rights owned by insiders from cash flow rights owned by insiders, 
will provide evidence in favor of Hypothesis 1a (2a). We further investigate Hypotheses 1b and 
2b by replacing WEDGE with the proportion of voting rights (VR) and cash flow rights (CFR) 
                                                 
11 The consensus forecast here refers to the mean forecast. Our inferences are unchanged using the median forecast. 
Following Horton et al. (2013), we use a three months forecast horizon for our base line results. As reported below, 
our results are similar when we use alternative forecast horizons, i.e., the consensus forecasts made most recently, 
six months, or nine months before the end of the reporting period.  
12 As a test of robustness, we alternatively require a minimum of three or five forecasts to compute dispersion. While 
these choices reduce the sample size, results remain qualitatively unchanged. 
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owned by insiders for in model (1). We expect a negative (positive) coefficient on VR (CFR) 
when ACC is the dependent variable and the opposite signs when DISP is the dependent variable.  
Our first set of controls reflects firm characteristics. lnSIZE is the natural log of market 
capitalization, LOSS represents an indicator variable equaling one if net income for the firm is 
negative, and zero otherwise, and EPS_VOL is the standard deviation of earning per share over 
the prior five-year period (or as many years as available). Second, we control for forecast 
characteristics. HORIZON is the number of calendar days between the I/B/E/S consensus 
forecast date and fiscal year end, and FOLLOW is the number of analysts following a firm, 
measured by the number of individual financial analyst forecasts included in the computation of 
the consensus forecast. As a third set of controls, we include the set of corporate governance 
characteristics used by Byard et al. (2006): CEO_CHAIR is an indicator variable equal to one if 
the CEO is also the chair of the board, and zero otherwise; BOARD_SIZE is the number of 
directors on the board; IND_DIR is the percentage of independent directors; and INST_OWN is 
the proportion of stock held by institutional investors.13 Data for CEO_CHAIR, BOARD_SIZE, 
and IND_DIR, have been collected from firms' annual proxy statements; institutional ownership 
data (INST_OWN) is sourced from Thomson Reuters. Finally, we control for year and industry 
effects by including year and industry (Fama & French, 1997) indicator variables in all models. 
In addition to examining single stage results from model (1), we conduct two additional 
analyses which control for potential sample selection bias or endogeneity. It is possible that dual-
class firms are different from single-class firms with respect to characteristics other than dual-
class status, and that such differences affect the association between insiders’ disproportionate 
                                                 
13 We do not include the proportion of independent directors serving on the audit committee (Byard et al., 2006). 
Following passage of the Sarbanes Oxley Act in 2002, all members of the audit committee must be independent 
directors. Accordingly, the variable would be invariant for the majority of our sample period, which ranges from 
2000 to 2012. 
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control rights and the forecasting environment of financial analysts. Accordingly, analyses of a 
sample of dual-class firms could be affected by self-selection bias and, as a consequence, our 
findings may not extend to single-class firms. We therefore control for possible sample selection 
effects by using the Heckman (1979) methodology.  
To this end, we estimate the following probit model, based on GIM (2010), which models 
the decision to establish a dual-class ownership structure at the time of a firm’s going public 
based on various proxies for the availability of private benefits of control: 
Pr(DUAL) =  β0 + β1NAMEi + β2MEDIAi + β3SALESRANKi + β4PROFITRANKi + 
β5%FIRMSi + β6%SALESi + β7SALES/REGIONSALESi + 
βkLISTINGYEARi + βjINDUSTRYi + ε (2) 
The dependent variable DUAL is equal to one for firms electing a dual-class structure and 
zero otherwise. The independent variables are an indicator if at IPO the firm name contains a 
person’s name; an indicator if the firm operated in the media industry at the time of its IPO;14 the 
percentile rank of the firm’s sales and profits in the year of its IPO relative to firms with the 
same IPO year; the percentage of all firms and all sales in the same Core Based Statistical Area 
(CBSA) in the year prior to the firm’s IPO; the percentage of the firm’s sales relative to the sales 
of all firms in the same CBSA in the year of its IPO; and indicator variables for the CRSP listing 
year and forty-eight Fama & French (1997) industries.15 Results indicate that NAME, MEDIA, 
and SALESRANK (SALES/REGIONSALES) are significantly positively (negatively) associated 
                                                 
14 Smart & Zutter (2003) and GIM (2010) suggest that dual-class shares are more common among firms operating in 
media industries. About twenty percent of firms in our dual-class sample are media firms compared to about three 
percent of such firms in the population. 
15 We include all variables identified in GIM (2010) in model (2), except for the state anti-takeover law variable 
(Gompers, Ishii, & Metrick, 2003), because necessary data to construct the index are not available after 2006. All 
variables are defined as in GIM (2010). We thank Paul Gompers, Joy Ishii, and Andrew Metrick for providing the 
name indicator variable for the universe of firms in GIM (2010). For firms not included in their study, we follow 
their procedure to identify the presence of a family name in the firm name. If a firm is not headquartered in an 
identifiable CBSA, we use the county as the firm’s geographic area. 
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with the probability of choosing a dual-class structure.16 Following Amoako-Adu, Baulkaran, & 
Smith (2014) and McGuire, Wang, & Wilson (2014), we use the coefficient estimates from 
model (2) to construct an inverse Mills ratio (INV_MILL, Heckman, 1979), which we include as 
a control for sample selection bias in model (1).  
Endogeneity is a concern in any study of firms’ corporate governance or ownership 
characteristics. We therefore perform a two-stage least squares (2SLS) analysis and regress 
WEDGE, VR, and CFR, and on a set of firm-level instrumental variables identified in Khalil, 
Magnan, & Cohen. (2008) and Haw et al. (2010): 
WEDGE (VR, CFR)it =  β0 + β1FAMILYit + β2FIN_NEEDit + β3ΔSALESit + β4lnATit + 
β5ROAit + β6INTANGit + β7MEDIAit + β8FIRMAGEit + ε (3) 
FAMILY indicates a family firm defined as a firm where the founder and/or his or her 
descendants own 25% or more of the firm’s voting rights (Andres, 2008). We research firms’ 
founders from SEC filings and publicly available sources. FIN_NEED is a firm’s need for 
financing, proxied by ROE / (1-ROE) as in Khalil et al. (2008); ΔSALES is percentage sales 
growth; lnAT is the natural log of total assets; ROA is income before extraordinary items divided 
by total assets; INTANG is the percentage of intangible assets, computed as 1 – [(net PPE + 
inventories) / total assets]; MEDIA is indicator variable that takes a value of one if the firm 
operates in the media industry, and zero otherwise; FIRMAGE is the age of the firm, based on its 
founding year which we collected from publicly available information. In our third set of 
regressions, we replace WEDGE, VR, and CFR and with their predicted values from the first-
stage regression model (3) as an explicit control for endogeneity. 
                                                 
16 For brevity, we do not tabulate results for model (2). Results are available upon request. 
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IV. Empirical Analysis 
Descriptive Statistics 
Table 1 reports descriptive statistics concerning our baseline sample of dual-class firms, 
which encompasses 356 unique firms contributing a total of 2,050 firm-years. The clear majority 
of observations (n = 1,910) have two classes of shares. In the remaining 140 cases more than two 
classes of common stock exist (6.8% of the sample). In 82.2% of cases, differences exist in the 
number of votes per share in the election of the board of directors. In addition, voting schemes 
whereby each class of stock elects a certain number of directors are common, as 595 
observations (29.0% of sample) maintain this arrangement. The proportion of firms with unequal 
votes across classes of shares and disproportionate board election rights exceeds 100% due to 
firms which adopt both of these elements.  
While voting rights differ substantially, all shares are generally entitled to receive equal 
dividends. In only 10.8% of observations, do dividend rights differ across classes of stock. Also, 
in only 32 observations (1.6% of sample) we find that shares that are identical with respect to 
voting and cash flow rights, but differ in other characteristics only, for instance, differences may 
pertain to redemption rights or voting rights other than in the election of the board. This indicates 
that firm overwhelmingly chose dual-class structures to create a discrepancy between voting and 
cash-flow rights across classes of shares. 
With respect to the voting and ownership structure, insiders on average own 79.0% of the 
superior, but only 12% of the inferior, shares outstanding.17 The median superior class of stock 
                                                 
17 For ease of exposition, we exclude firms with more than two classes of common stock from the descriptive 
statistics of the voting and ownership structure.  
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has ten votes per share, whereas the median inferior share only commands one vote.18 Among 
firms that maintain disproportionate board representation schemes, the median (mean) proportion 
of directors that are elected by the superior class is 66.7% (62.9%), the remaining number of 
directors being elected by the inferior class. "Benign" dual-class structures, where insiders 
predominantly hold the inferior class of shares, are rare. In only 74 observations (3.6% of 
sample) do we find that insiders own fewer voting rights than cash flow rights.  
Finally, with respect to our variables of interest, insiders of the firm control median 
(mean) voting rights in the election of the board of directors of 59.5% (55.9%) compared to cash 
flow rights of 20.8% (26.6%). The ratio of voting rights to cash flow, our primary measure of the 
degree of separation between the two, shows that insiders command a median (mean) of 2.35 
(2.69) times the number of voting rights as they do cash flow rights. The median (mean) 
difference between the proportion of voting and cash flow rights owned by insiders, our alternate 
measure of the wedge between the two, is 29.3% (28.0%). 
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
Descriptive statistics of our control variables are summarized in Table 2. Median (mean) 
lnSIZE of our sample firms is 20.42 (20.47), which corresponds to a median (mean) market 
capitalization of 740 (3,877) million dollars. Loss years represent 18.5% of our sample, which 
spans two financial crises. Descriptive statistics of the board characteristics variables reveal that 
the CEO serves as chairman of the board in 51.6% of our sample. BOARD_SIZE is fairly 
uniform across our sample with a mean and median of nine directors and a standard deviation of 
                                                 
18 The mean number of votes per share for the superior class is affected by eleven total observations from three 
firms, Lin TV Corporation, Virgin Mobile US, and Prodigy Communications. These firms only have one or two 
superior shares outstanding, but each share entitles its bear to millions of votes. For instance, Prodigy 
Communications reports 70.245 million shares of Class A common stock and only one share of Class B common 
stock outstanding in its 2001 proxy statement. However, its only share of Class B common stock entitles its owner to 
51.843 million votes per share. Removing, these observations does not affect our results. 
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2.33. On average, 62% of the board is comprised of independent directors, very similar to the 
64.3% mean independent directors reported by Byard et al. (2006). Lastly, median (mean) 
institutional ownership amounts to 72.5% (68.8%). 
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
Regression Results 
Column A of Table 3 displays the results of our single stage regression of forecast 
accuracy on disproportionate insider control and controls, model (1). The coefficient on WEDGE 
is negative and significant (t = -3.39, p < 0.01, two-tailed). This finding supports our hypothesis 
H1a, indicating that the accuracy of financial analysts’ earnings forecasts decrease as the extent 
of separation of voting rights from cash flow rights increases. With respect to our controls, firm 
size is positively and significantly associated with forecast accuracy, whereas LOSS, EPS_VOL, 
FOLLOW, and DISP all show a significant negative association, consistent with prior research. 
While most of the firm and forecast characteristics controls are significant, we find little support 
for our governance characteristics controls except for INST_OWN, which displays a significant 
positive association with accuracy.19 
We repeat our analysis replacing WEDGE with its two individual components, VR and 
CFR. Results of a regression of forecast accuracy on insider voting and cash flow rights and 
controls are reported in Table 3, Column B. The coefficient on VR is negative and significant (t = 
-2.45, p = 0.015, two-tailed), while the coefficient on CFR is positive and significant (t = 3.55, p 
< 0.01, two-tailed). These results confirm that forecast accuracy increases in insider cash flow 
                                                 
19 The positive association of institutional ownership INST_OWN with forecast accuracy ACC is consistent with the 
findings by Ljungqvist et al. (2007) and Kerl & Ohlert (2015), but opposite to Byard et al. (2006). Differences in the 
data source may explain the divergent results. Kerl & Ohlert (2015) rely on FactSet/LionShares for their institutional 
ownership data. Byard et al. (2006) use RiskMetrics data. Ljungqvist et al. (2007) retrieve institutional ownership 
data from Thomson Reuters, which is also our source. A positive association may be more plausible because 
institutional investors positively affect reporting quality by acting as effective monitors (Velury & Jenkins, 2006).  
19 
 
rights, and decreases in insider voting rights, supporting our hypothesis H1b. Results for our 
control variables remain qualitatively unchanged from those previously reported. 
In columns C and D of Table 3 we report results specifically controlling for sample 
selection bias by employing the Heckman (1979) methodology, and adding INV_MILL, the 
inverse Mills ratio derived from an estimation of model (2), to model (1). Results are not affected 
by using this alternate approach; WEDGE, VR and CFR all remain statistically significant at 
similar levels. 
To control for endogeneity, we also replicate our analyses using a 2SLS approach. In the 
first-stage regression, we regress the potentially endogenous variables WEDGE, VR, and CFR on 
the set of instrumental variables identified in Khalil et al. (2008) and Haw et al. (2010), model 
(3). The explanatory power of the first stage regression is reasonable, with an R2 ranging from 
9.4% to 17.6% and comparable to the R2 of approximately 14.3% achieved by Khalil et al. 
(2008). With the exception of ROA and ΔSALES, all variables are significant. The first-stage 
regression results are summarized in Table 4. 
[Insert Table 4 about here] 
Next, we re-estimate model (1) replacing WEDGE, VR, and CFR with their predicted 
values from model (3). Results, presented in Columns E and F of Table 3, indicate that all 
variables remain significant at comparably (strong) levels. The coefficients of WEDGE, VR, and 
CFR are greater in the second stage of the 2SLS regression compared to the results from our 
single-stage approach. We interpret these increases as evidence for a reduction in single-equation 
bias from using a 2SLS approach. (Beaver, McAnally, & Stinson, 1997).  
Regressions results of model (1) using financial analysts’ forecast dispersion, DISP, as 
the dependent variable are in reported in Table 5. Column A shows that the coefficient on 
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WEDGE is positive and significant (t = 3.54, p < 0.01, two-tailed) indicating that the dispersion 
of financial analysts' earnings forecasts increases in disproportionate insider ownership. This 
finding supports our hypothesis H2a. In general, results for the control variables in the dispersion 
regression complement those for accuracy, such that characteristics which increase accuracy 
reduce dispersion.  
In Column B of Table 5, we report results including VR and CFR in place of WEDGE. 
VR is positively related to DISP (t = 2.04, p = 0.042, two-tailed), while the association of CFR 
with DISP is negative (t = -3.23, p < 0.01, two-tailed). We thus find support also for H2b as 
insider voting rights (cash flow rights) are significantly positively (negatively) related to forecast 
dispersion. Results for the control variables are not materially different from the results in 
Column A. 
[Insert Table 5 about here] 
In columns C and D of Table 5 we show results for our regressions of analysts’ forecast 
dispersion on WEDGE, VR, and CFR when controlling for sample selection bias. Similarly, 
columns E and F of Table 5 show results of our 2SLS approach to adjust for endogeneity. In 
either case results are consistent with our single stage regression results and display comparable 
levels of statistical significance. 
Taken together, results in Tables 3 and 5 confirm that insider voting and cash flow rights 
exert divergent effects on the accuracy and dispersion of financial analysts’ earnings forecasts. 
Specifically, we find a negative (positive) association of the degree of separation of insider 
voting from cash flow rights with forecast accuracy (dispersion). This finding is in line with 
Francis et al. (2005) and Fan & Wong (2002), who report that the informativeness of mandatory 
financial reporting decreases as the separation of voting rights from cash flow rights increases. A 
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possible alternate effect, suggested by Nguyen & Xu (2010) or Chen (2008) who find that 
earnings management activities decrease in firms characterized by disproportionate control and 
that the forecasting environment hence could be improved, appears unlikely given our findings 
Also supporting an entrenchment explanation, we find that insider voting rights decrease 
forecast accuracy, and increase forecast dispersion, while, confirming an incentive story, insider 
cash flow rights increase accuracy, and decrease dispersion. These results are consistent with 
insiders reducing the amount and/or reliability of information provided as their entrenchment 
from voting rights increases. A reduced amount or reliability of public information decrease 
financial analysts' ability to issue accurate forecasts, and increases the need to substitute private 
for common information (Barron et al., 2002) with a resulting increase in forecast dispersion. 
Conversely, a richer information environment associated with insider cash flow rights enhances 
forecast accuracy and decreases dispersion.  
Taken as a whole, our results appear to conflict with Haw et al. (2010), who pose similar 
hypotheses concerning the association of control-cash flow divergence and analysts’ forecast 
properties, but do not find a significant effect on average. Our strong divergent results using a 
contemporary sample of U.S. dual-class firms may be due to the fact that Haw et al. (2010) 
document that the association between control-cash flow divergence and forecast properties is 
contingent on the effectiveness of a country’s legal regime.20 More importantly, we focus on 
insider ownership, whereas Haw et al. (2010) examine control-cash flow divergence of the 
controlling owner regardless of whether this owner is an insider or outsider, a family, the state, a 
                                                 
20 Haw et al.’s (2010) sample comprises firms from nine East Asian and thirteen Western European countries in the 
1990 to 1996 period. We note as a limitation to our study that our results may not generalize to other jurisdictions. 
However, because the U.S. is widely seen as offering a high quality legal system with strong enforcement, we posit 
that the negative effects of insider control-cash flow divergence on analysts’ forecast properties likely are only more 
pronounced in countries with weaker legal regimes. Indeed, Haw et al. (2010) find negative effects of control-cash 
flow divergence of the controlling owner only in a set of countries with weak legal institutions. 
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financial institution, or other corporation. It is likely that our narrower focus on insider 
ownership enables us to find stronger results, because motives and incentives to influence the 
information environment are likely not constant across different types of ultimate owners. 
Additional analyses 
Alternate forecast horizons 
We follow Horton et al. (2013) and Byard et al. (2006) and examine the robustness of our 
results to different forecast horizons. Our base line results, reported in Tables 3 and 5, are for 
forecasts issued on average three months prior to the end of the reporting period. We choose one 
shorter horizon, the most recent forecast issued before the end of the reporting period, as well as 
two longer forecasting periods: forecasts issued on average six and nine months before the end of 
the reporting period. Table 6 (Table 7) show regression results of ACC (DISP) on VR and CFR 
across these three alternate forecasts horizons. Overall, results are not affected. For forecast 
accuracy, the coefficients are negative on VR, and positive on CFR, and remain statistically 
significant across all alternate horizons (Table 6). In the dispersion regressions, VR dips slightly 
below two-tailed significance at the most recent horizon. All other results remain similar across 
alternate horizons with positive (negative) coefficients on VR (CFR) and comparable 
significance levels (Table 7).  
[Insert Tables 6 and 7 about here] 
For brevity, we do not tabulate results of these analyses for WEDGE. All results for 
WEDGE are similar to those reported in Tables 3 and 5 when using alternate forecast horizons. 
In the accuracy regressions, the effect of WEDGE is significant at the p < .01 level across all 
three alternate horizons. In the dispersion regressions, WEDGE is significant at the p < .05 level 
for the most recent horizon, and at the p < .01 level for the six and nine month horizons. 
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Changes model 
Our theoretical framework assumes a particular direction of causality, where an 
increasing divergence of insider voting rights from their cash flow rights leads to lower forecast 
accuracy and increased forecast dispersion. We acknowledge that our empirical analyses 
presented thus far mainly demonstrate association. To shed additional light on the relationship 
between disproportionate insider control and financial analysts’ forecasting environment, we 
therefore also estimate the following changes specification of model (1): 
ΔACC (ΔDISP)it =  β0 + β1ΔWEDGEit + β2ΔlnSIZEit + β3ΔLOSSit + β4ΔEPS_VOLit + 
β5ΔHORIZONit + β6ΔFOLLOWit + β7ΔCEO_CHAIRit + 
β8ΔBOARD_SIZEit + β9ΔIND_DIRit + β10ΔINST_OWNit + ε (4) 
In model (4), we regress changes in financial analysts’ forecast accuracy (and dispersion) 
on contemporaneous changes in insiders’ disproportionate control (ΔWEDGE) and controls. We 
also examine the association of the prior year change in disproportionate control, ΔWEDGEt-1, 
with the contemporaneous change in ACC and DISP. Results are presented in Table 8. 
[Insert Table 8 about here] 
The analysis reveals that, consistent with the results for our levels model, changes in 
disproportionate insider control, modelled either as the contemporaneous or lagged change, are 
significantly associated with corresponding changes in financial analysts’ forecast accuracy and 
dispersion. Our finding that the lagged change in disproportionate control is more strongly 
associated with accuracy and dispersion than the contemporaneous change suggests that changes 
in disproportionate control may affect changes in firms’ information practices with delay. 
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Additional endogeneity tests 
Endogeneity is a concern in any study of firms’ corporate governance or ownership 
characteristics. One concern with regard to endogeneity is the possibility of omitted variables 
that may jointly impact financial analysts’ forecasting environments and WEDGE, VR, and CFR. 
Our primary approach to address the endogeneity problem is by means of the two-stage least 
squares analysis presented above. All results proved robust to this approach. However, to further 
address the possibility that insiders' incentives to select a particular ownership structure drive not 
only the choice of ownership structure, but also affect the forecasting environment of financial 
analysts’, we conduct two additional tests.  
As suggested by Masulis et al. (2009), one important factor likely affecting insiders’ 
incentives to choose a specific ownership structure is the availability of private benefits of 
control. Insiders of firms with a higher capacity for private benefits may be more likely to 
establish a dual-class structure which enables the extraction of perquisites. At the same time, 
insiders interested in extracting private benefits of control potentially have increased incentives 
to reduce publicly available information when more opportunities to extract private benefits 
exist. Following Masulis et al. (2009), we control for existent opportunities for private benefits 
of control by including the variables predicting dual-class status based on a firm’s private 
benefits capacity from model (2) directly in model (1). Moreover, related to the idea that a firm’s 
private benefits’ capacity may be affecting both the selection of its ownership structure as well as 
analysts' forecasting environment, we also add an explicit control for firms’ compensation 
structure, CEO total compensation (Execucomp variable TDC1), to model (1). Our inferences are 
unchanged when including these two additional controls for firms’ private benefits capacity to 
our model.  
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Finally, to address concerns of reverse causality, we follow Masulis et al. (2009) and 
replace the annual values of WEDGE in our levels regressions with its value in the year of a 
firm’s first appearance in our sample, as well as with its prior year (lagged) value. Results are not 
materially affected by these alternate specifications. 
Other tests 
We also test a number of alternative definitions of our variables. We use the difference 
between VR and CFR, instead of the ratio of the two, as an alternate specification of WEDGE 
(GIM, 2010). We also replicate all regressions requiring a minimum of three or five observations 
for the computation of dispersion. Instead of the mean, we also use the median consensus 
earnings forecasts in our forecast accuracy models. With respect to our control variables, we 
alternatively use the natural logarithm of the book value of assets as a control for firm size; 
define HORIZON relative to the earnings announcement date, instead of relative to the fiscal 
period end date; use the log of FOLLOW and BOARD_SIZE, instead of their count values; and 
use NAICS industry controls instead of Fama & French (1997) industries. To ensure that results 
are not driven by, or sensitive to, the inclusion of a small number of observations with 
uncommon dual-class structures where difference in between classes of shares do not pertain to 
voting or cash flow rights (32 observations), or where insiders primarily hold the inferior class of 
shares (73 observations), we rerun all analyses excluding these subsets of firms. Results are not 
affected by these choices.  
V. Summary and Conclusion 
Using a comprehensive hand-collected sample of U.S. dual-class firms, we assess the 
distinct effects of insider voting and cash flow rights on analyst forecast accuracy and dispersion. 
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Some studies establish that the quality (Francis et al., 2005) and credibility (Fan & Wong, 2002) 
of financial reporting decreases as the wedge between insider voting and cash flow right widens. 
However, other studies provide evidence of improved financial reporting quality in the presence 
of disproportionate insider control (Ngyuen & Xu, 2010; Chen, 2008). We find that 
disproportionate insider control is negatively (positively) associated with the accuracy 
(dispersion) financial analysts’ forecasts. Moreover, insider cash flow rights (insider voting 
rights) are positively (negatively) associated with financial analyst forecast accuracy, and 
negatively (positively) associated with forecast dispersion. These results are robust to controls 
for sample-selection bias and endogeneity, and not affected by choosing alternative forecast 
horizons or estimation techniques. 
In contrast to prior studies, our results demonstrate that insider ownership does affect the 
information environment of financial analysts, and that the opposing incentive-alignment and 
entrenchment effects cause it to do so in a non-monotonic fashion. Forecast accuracy 
(dispersion) increases (decreases) in insider cash flow rights likely due to an incentive-alignment 
effect, which positively affects the quality of financial reporting, while at the same time forecast 
accuracy (dispersion) decreases (increases) in insider voting rights due to an entrenchment effect, 
which has been shown to negatively impact financial reporting. By delineating these two distinct 
effects of insider ownership on forecast accuracy and dispersion, we augment, and offer an 
explanation for, prior research that did not discern a significant association of insider ownership 
with financial analysts' earnings forecast accuracy (Byard et al., 2006; Haw et al., 2010; García-
Meca & Sánchez-Ballesta, 2011).  
We use a sample of U.S. dual-class firms primarily as a laboratory that enables us to 
separately assess the incentive and entrenchment effects of insider ownership, which are 
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confounded in single-class firms. However, our examination of forecast accuracy and dispersion 
in dual-class firms is also of interest as a study of this particular subset of firms in its own right. 
A spate of high profile IPOs of technology firms with a dual-class structure of common stock has 
recently thrust this equity structure to the fore.21 Dual-class firms, which comprised about 6% of 
U.S. public firms in the 1995 to 2002 period (GIM, 2010), now account for 8.7% of companies 
included in the Russell 3000 index (Equilar, 2015). In 2013, 13.6% of all U.S. firms conducting 
an initial public offering (IPO) adopted a dual-class structure of stock (Equilar, 2015). This 
increasing prominence of dual-class firms calls for a better understanding of their characteristics, 
especially with respect to these firms’ information behavior and their financial reporting quality. 
In the light of our findings, particular care appears to be justified in the generation of earnings 
forecasts for dual-class firms. Likewise, the decreased reliability of earnings forecasts as 
disproportionate insider control increases suggests particular caution from the investing public 
relying on financial analysts' earnings forecasts for these firms. 
 
  
                                                 
21 Google started the trend with its IPO in 2004, followed by other upstarts, such as LinkedIn, Zynga, Groupon, 
Yelp, and Facebook. 
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Table 1 
Descriptive Statistics of Dual-Class Firm Sample 
 N Mean Std. Dev. Q1 Median Q3 
Equity structure       
    More than two classes of shares 2,050 0.068 0.252 0.000 0.000 0.000 
    Unequal number of votes per class 2,050 0.822 0.382 1.000 1.000 1.000 
    Disproportionate board representation 2,050 0.290 0.454 0.000 0.000 1.000 
    Unequal dividends per class 2,050 0.108 0.311 0.000 0.000 0.000 
    No difference in voting or dividend rights 2,050 0.016 0.124 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Voting and ownership structure       
    Votes per share superior class* 1,910 27,462 1,186,257 1.000 10.000 10.000 
    Percent of superior shares owned by insiders* 1,910 0.790 0.305 0.681 0.954 1.000 
    Votes per share, inferior class* 1,910 0.850 0.351 1.000 1.000 1.000 
    Percent of inferior shares owned by insiders* 1,910 0.120 0.188 0.012 0.040 0.138 
    Proportionate board, elected by superior class** 555 0.629 0.172 0.547 0.667 0.727 
    Proportionate board, elected by inferior class** 555 0.367 0.170 0.273 0.333 0.434 
    Negative divergence: insider CFR exceed insider VR 2,050 0.036 0.185 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Variables of interest       
    VR  2,050 0.559 0.267 0.361 0.595 0.755 
    CFR 2,050 0.266 0.207 0.105 0.208 0.390 
    WEDGE (ratio) 2,050 2.690 1.409 1.508 2.349 3.680 
    WEDGE (difference) 2,050 0.280 0.164 0.150 0.293 0.432 
The sample represents 2,050 firm-years (356 unique firms) used in the regressions of forecast accuracy and dispersion at the three months forecast horizon (baseline 
results; Tables 3 and 5). For parsimony of exposition, we eliminate observations with more than two classes of shares from certain descriptive statistics such that 
inferior (superior) refers to the inferior (superior) class of two classes of stock. Variable definitions: VR is the proportion of voting rights owned by insiders; CFR is the 
proportion of dividend rights owned by insiders. WEDGE is the divergence of insider voting from cash flow rights computed as the ratio of, or difference between, VR 
and CFR. * indicates descriptive statistics excludes 140 observations (6.8% of sample) with more than two classes of stock. ** indicates descriptive statistics for sub-set 
of firms with disproportionate board representation rights (n = 596) excludes 40 observations (6.7%) with more than two classes of stock.  
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Table 2 
Descriptive Statistics of Select Variables  
 Mean Std. Dev. Q1 Median Q3 
Dependent variables      
    ACC -0.060 0.427 -0.014 -0.004 -0.001 
    DISP 0.017 0.167 0.001 0.002 0.006 
Firm characteristics controls      
    lnSIZE 20.474 1.662 19.302 20.423 21.481 
    LOSS 0.185 0.388 0.000 0.000 0.000 
    EPS_VOL 0.237 3.614 0.012 0.023 0.059 
Forecast characteristics controls      
    FOLLOW 8.010 6.191 3.000 6.000 11.000 
    HORIZON 74.493 2.080 73.000 74.000 76.000 
Governance characteristics controls      
    CEO_CHAIR 0.516 0.500 0.000 1.000 1.000 
    BOARD_SIZE 8.953 2.327 7.000 9.000 10.000 
    IND_DIR 0.619 0.162 0.500 0.625 0.727 
    INST_OWN 0.688 0.221 0.558 0.725 0.860 
The sample represents 2,050 firm-years (356) unique firms). Variable definitions: ACC is analyst forecast accuracy, calculated as (|Mean Forecast – Actual EPS| / Stock 
Price) multiplied by -1; DISP is the standard deviation of analyst forecasts scaled by stock price; lnSIZE is the natural logarithm of market value; LOSS is an indicator 
variable if net income is negative, and zero otherwise; EPS_VOL is the standard deviation of EPS over the prior five years, scaled by the stock price; FOLLOW is the 
number of analysts’ forecasts used in computing the consensus forecast; HORIZON is the number of days between the I/B/E/S consensus forecast date and fiscal year 
end; CEO_CHAIR is an indicator variable equal to one if the CEO is also the chair of the board, and zero otherwise; BOARD_SIZE is the number of directors on the 
board; IND_DIR is the percentage of independent directors; INST_OWN is the proportion of stock held by institutional investors.  
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Table 3 
The Association of Insider Voting and Cash Flow Rights with Forecast Accuracy 
 Column A  Column B  Column C
  Column D  Column E  Column F  
  Coeff. est. t value  
Coeff. 
est. t value  
Coeff. 
est. t value 
 Coeff. 
est. t value 
 Coeff. 
est. t value 
 Coeff. 
est. t value 
 
     WEDGE -5.00 -3.39 a    -4.13 -3.14 
a    -23.16 -3.92 a    
     VR    -26.49 -2.45 b    -27.95 -2.18 b    -109.56 -3.47 a 
     CFR    52.73 3.55 a    41.37 3.38 a    226.63 3.41 a 
Firm characteristics controls             
    
     lnSIZE 7.86 4.70 a 7.65 4.52 a 8.06 4.77 a 8.05 4.70 a 10.55 5.31 a 10.30 5.00 a 
     LOSS -59.71 -9.19 a -59.64 -9.20 a -57.72 -8.84 a -57.67 -8.81 a -63.54 -8.88 a -63.31 -8.84 a 
     EPS_VOL -95.96 -5.39 a -95.59 -5.50 a -86.14 -5.19 a -86.41 -5.23 a -90.45 -5.46 a -90.42 -5.38 a 
Forecast characteristics controls       
          
     HORIZON -0.28 -0.46  -0.25 -0.41  -0.09 -0.15  -0.08 -0.13  -0.02 -0.04  0.00 0.00  
     FOLLOW -0.77 -2.59 a -0.72 -2.37 b -0.80 -2.69 a -0.78 -2.59 b -0.94 -3.04 a -0.94 -3.01 a 
Governance characteristics controls       
          
     CEO_CHAIR -0.31 -0.10  -0.26 -0.09  -2.24 -0.77  -2.24 -0.78  -1.17 -0.41  -1.42 -0.50  
     BOARD_SIZE -0.69 -0.98  -0.69 -0.96  -0.45 -0.64  -0.47 -0.66  -0.16 -0.22  -0.17 -0.24  
     IND_DIR 0.74 0.70  12.64 1.08  13.34 1.24  18.88 1.58  10.32 0.97  11.48 1.06  
     INST_OWN 7.39 3.68 a 35.82 4.01 a 31.33 3.68 a 34.33 3.91 a 28.24 3.35 a 28.04 3.32 a 
Heckman selection control        
          
     INV_MILL       3.51 0.86  3.72 0.93  -3.85 -0.91  -2.27 -0.55  
Model F statistic  10.65 
a 
 10.01 
a  10.29 a  9.89 a  13.27 a  12.41 a 
Adjusted R2  0.418   0.420   0.400 
  0.400   0.415   0.413  
N  2,050   2,050   1,993 
  1,993   1,915   1,915  
The dependent variable is ACC, forecast accuracy, calculated as (|Mean Forecast – Actual EPS| / Stock Price) multiplied by -1; WEDGE is the divergence of insider 
voting rights from cash flow rights computed as the ratio of VR to CFR; VR is the proportion of voting rights owned by insiders; CFR is the proportion of dividend rights 
owned by insiders. Other variables are defined in Table 2. All models include an intercept, as well as year and Fama & French (1997) indicator variables. Test statistics 
and significance levels are calculated based on standard errors (Rogers) clustered at the firm level. Letters a and b denote significance at the 1% and 5% levels, 
respectively (two-sided tests). Coefficient estimates are multiplied by 1,000 for purposes of exposition.  
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Table 4 
2SLS: First Stage Regression Results  
 Column A  Column B  Column C  
Dependent Variables: WEDGE  VR  CFR  
 Coeff. 
est. t value 
 Coeff. 
est. t value 
 Coeff. 
est. t value 
 
     FAMILY 0.464 6.71 a 0.215 17.15 a 0.065 6.42 a 
     FIN_NEED 0.180 2.03 b 0.032 2.02 b -0.010 -0.77  
     ΔSALES -0.142 -1.38  -0.011 -0.06  0.005 0.31  
     lnAT 0.150 7.06 a -0.014 -3.69 a -0.020 -6.54 a 
     ROA 0.281 1.43  -0.027 -0.77  -0.032 -1.12  
     INTANG 0.624 4.30 a -0.073 -2.77 a -0.089 -4.19 a 
     MEDIA -0.163 -1.94 a 0.121 7.95 a 0.084 6.89 a 
     FIRMAGE 0.267 5.81 a -0.078 -9.31 a -0.064 -9.48 a 
Model F statistic  26.52 a  53.33 a  27.07 a 
Adjusted R2  0.094   0.176   0.096  
N  1,962   1,962   1,962  
The dependent variables are WEDGE, the divergence of insider voting rights from cash flow rights computed as the ratio 
of VR to CFR, VR the proportion of voting rights owned by insiders, and CFR the proportion of dividend rights owned by 
insiders. FAMILY is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the founder and/or the founder’s familial descendants 
own 25% or more of outstanding voting rights; FIN_NEED is ROE/(1-ROE); ΔSALES is percentage sales growth; lnAT is 
natural log of total assets; ROA is income before extraordinary items divided by total assets; INTANG is 1 – (Net PPE + 
Inventories)/Total Assets; MEDIA is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if a firm is a member of the media industry; 
FIRMAGE is age of the firm. Test statistics and significance levels are calculated based on standard errors (Rogers) 
clustered at the firm level. Letters a and b denote significance at the 1% and 5% levels, respectively (two-sided tests). 
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Table 5 
The Association of Insider Voting and Cash flow Rights with Forecast Dispersion 
 
 Column A  Column B  Column C
  Column D  Column E  Column F  
  Coeff. est. t value  
Coeff. 
est. t value  
Coeff. 
est. t value 
 Coeff. 
est. t value 
 Coeff. 
est. t value 
 Coeff. 
est. t value 
 
     WEDGE 1.54 3.54 a    1.25 3.58 
a    7.61 4.29 a    
     VR    7.28 2.04 b    4.12 1.74 c    40.14 3.95 a 
     CFR    -15.44 -3.23 a    -11.44 -3.25 a    -83.35 -4.35 a 
Firm characteristics controls                       lnSIZE -2.70 -5.79 a -2.64 -5.60 a -2.81 -5.99 a 2.83 -5.97 a -3.57 -6.63 a -3.60 -6.53 a 
     LOSS 15.18 9.47 a 15.17 9.46 a 14.18 9.33 a 14.16 9.30 a 14.53 9.22 a 14.60 9.20 a 
     EPS_VOL 27.39 4.49 a 27.31 4.60 a 23.64 4.55 a 23.73 4.59 a 26.02 5.00 a 26.06 5.00 a 
Forecast characteristics controls       
          
     HORIZON -0.23 -1.43  -0.24 -1.68 c -0.22 -1.39  -0.22 -1.39  -0.20 -1.18  -0.20 -1.23  
     FOLLOW 0.24 2.70 a 0.22 2.47 b 0.25 2.94 a 0.25 2.85 a 0.28 3.54 a 0.29 3.51 a 
Governance characteristics controls       
          
     CEO_CHAIR 0.27 0.30   0.25 0.28  0.87 1.09  0.87 1.10  0.52 0.69  0.61 0.81  
     BOARD_SIZE 0.73 3.83 a 0.73 3.81 a 0.63 3.51 a 0.64 3.54 a 0.42 2.49 b 0.41 2.37 b 
     IND_DIR -0.42 -0.15  -2.18 -0.70  -2.55 -0.96  -4.49 -1.59  -0.40 -0.16  -0.67 -0.26  
     INST_OWN -10.42 -3.91 a -11.51 -4.31 a -9.52 -3.64 a -10.28 -3.95 a -7.88 -3.10 a -7.87 -3.05 a 
Heckman selection control        
          
     INV_MILL       1.65 1.29  1.54 1.21  3.54 2.97 a 3.17 2.66 a 
Model F statistic  84.97 
a 
 38.88 
a  28.94 a  29.87 a  28.96 a  31.30 a 
Adjusted R2  0.437   0.438   0.418 
  0.418   0.443   0.443  
N  2,050   2,050   1,993 
  1,993   1,915   1,915  
The dependent variable is DISP, the standard deviation of analyst forecasts scaled by stock price; WEDGE is the divergence of insider voting rights from cash flow rights 
computed as the ratio of VR to CFR; VR is the proportion of voting rights owned by insiders; CFR is the proportion of dividend rights owned by insiders. Other variables 
are defined in Table 2. All models include an intercept, as well as year and Fama & French (1997) indicator variables. Test statistics and significance levels are calculated 
based on standard errors (Rogers) clustered at the firm level. Letters a, b, and c denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively (two-sided tests). 
Coefficient estimates are multiplied by 1,000 for purposes of exposition. 
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Table 6 
The Association of Insider Voting and Cash Flow Rights with Forecast Accuracy: 
Alternative Forecast Horizons 
 Column A  Column B  Column C  Horizon: Most recent  6 months  9 months  
 Coeff. est. t value  
Coeff. 
est. t value  
Coeff. 
est. t value  
     VR -24.53 -2.33 b -18.05 -1.76 c -26.69 -2.12 b 
     CFR 54.25 3.52 a 51.31 3.50 a 61.72 3.42 a 
Firm characteristics controls              lnSIZE 11.48 5.75 a 10.30 5.52 a 12.15 5.44 a 
     LOSS -54.45 -8.06 a -60.80 -9.43 a -67.66 -9.63 a 
     EPS_VOL -97.19 -6.20 a -125.25 -6.56 a -148.79 -6.22 a 
Forecast characteristics controls              HORIZON -0.18 -3.52 a -0.65 -0.89  -1.35 -1.68 c 
     FOLLOW -1.37 -3.98 a -0.95 -3.05 a -1.00 -3.38 a 
Governance characteristics controls             CEO_CHAIR 1.25 0.35  -0.60 -0.20  -2.50 -0.74   
     BOARD_SIZE -0.65 -0.82  -1.16 -1.67 c -0.55 -0.70  
     IND_DIR 18.15 1.38  9.86 0.88  16.94 1.38  
     INST_OWN 26.84 2.75 a 29.86 3.18 a 38.91 3.61 a 
          Model F statistic  8.57
a 
 21.18
a 
 17.70
a 
Adjusted R2  0.392   0.486   0.510  N  2,247   2,063   2,026  
The dependent variable is ACC, forecast accuracy, calculated as (|Mean Forecast – Actual EPS| / Stock Price) multiplied by -1; 
VR is the proportion of voting rights owned by insiders; CFR is the proportion of dividend rights owned by insiders. Other 
variables are defined in Table 2. All models include an intercept, as well as year and Fama & French (1997) indicator variables. 
Test statistics and significance levels are calculated based on standard errors (Rogers) clustered at the firm level. Letters a, b, 
and c denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively (two-sided tests). Coefficient estimates are multiplied by 
1,000 for purposes of exposition. 
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Table 7 
The Association of Insider Voting and Cash Flow Rights with Forecast Dispersion: 
Alternative Forecast Horizons 
 Column A  Column B  Column C  Horizon: Most recent  6 months  9 months  
 Coeff. est. t value  
Coeff. 
est. t value  
Coeff. 
est. t value  
     VR 6.66 1.61  8.00 2.24 b 7.76 2.00 b 
     CFR -15.83 -2.89 a -14.14 -2.99 a -14.34 -2.79 a 
Firm characteristics controls              lnSIZE -3.69 -6.10 a -2.74 -5.13 a -3.84 -5.90 a 
     LOSS 15.96 7.69 a 13.03 8.20 a 12.78 7.20 a 
     EPS_VOL 32.55 5.76 a 35.60 5.78 a 39.40 5.23 a 
Forecast characteristics controls              HORIZON 0.07 3.28 a 0.06 0.35  0.07 0.32  
     FOLLOW 0.41 3.72 a 0.25 3.06 a 0.42 3.87 a 
Governance characteristics controls             CEO_CHAIR -1.68 -1.43  0.27 0.31  -0.84 -0.86  
     BOARD_SIZE 0.96 3.42 a 0.64 3.10 a 0.89 3.62 a 
     IND_DIR -1.01 0.67  3.35 1.17  5.04 1.56  
     INST_OWN -8.97 -2.82 a -10.05 -4.24 a -10.44 -3.68 a 
          Model F statistic  93.38
a 
 25.37
a 
 14.19
a 
Adjusted R2  0.399   0.487   0.456  N  2,247   2,063   2,026  
The dependent variable is DISP, the standard deviation of analyst forecasts scaled by stock price; VR is the proportion of voting 
rights owned by insiders; CFR is the proportion of dividend rights owned by insiders. Other variables are defined in Table 2. 
All models include an intercept, as well as year and Fama & French (1997) indicator variables. Test statistics and significance 
levels are calculated based on standard errors (Rogers) clustered at the firm level. Letters a and b denote significance at the 1% 
and, 5% levels, respectively (two-sided tests). Coefficient estimates are multiplied by 1,000 for purposes of exposition. 
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Table 8 
The Association of Changes in Disproportionate Insider Control with Changes in Forecast 
Accuracy and Dispersion 
 
 Column A  Column B 
 Column C  Column D  
Dependent Variable ΔACC  ΔACC  ΔDISP  ΔDISP  
  Coeff. est. t value  
Coeff. 
est. t value 
 Coeff. 
est. t value 
 Coeff. 
est. t value 
 
     ΔWEDGE -8.91 -2.12 b    2.01 1.41 d    
     ΔWEDGEt-1    -16.78 -3.11 a    2.87 2.08 b 
Firm characteristics controls           
     ΔlnSIZE 45.35 6.92 a 46.44 6.53 a -11.52 -6.84 a -10.31 -7.30 a 
     ΔLOSS -46.85 -4.35 a -40.27 -4.12 a 4.01 2.52 b 3.35 2.50 b 
     ΔEPS_VOL 30.25 1.44  36.84 1.09  9.46 1.36  8.28 0.99  
Forecast characteristics controls           
     ΔHORIZON -0.04 -0.08  -0.29 -0.48  0.07 0.46  0.07 0.52  
     ΔFOLLOW 0.59 0.81  0.60 0.84  -0.31 -1.99 b -0.29 -1.99 b 
Governance characteristics controls           
     ΔCEO_CHAIR 4.76 0.72  11.45 1.89 c 0.14 0.11  -0.06 -0.06  
     ΔBOARD_SIZE 3.96 2.56 b 4.99 2.58 b 0.25 0.66  0.24 0.66  
     ΔIND_DIR -56.14 -3.14 a -56.63 -3.00 a 19.66 2.97 a 18.10 3.14 a 
     ΔINST_OWN 40.22 2.26 b 43.76 2.25 b -7.59 -2.03 b -4.97 -1.39  
      
       
Model F statistic  24.48 a  2.38 a  2.90 a  4.17 a 
Adjusted R2  0.260   0.247   0.220   0.215  
N  1,694   1,406   1,694   1,406  
The dependent variables are ΔACC, the change in forecast accuracy, calculated as (|Mean Forecast – Actual EPS| / Stock 
Price) multiplied by -1 and ΔDISP, the change in the standard deviation of analyst forecasts scaled by stock price; ΔWEDGE 
is the change in the divergence of voting rights from cash flow rights computed as the change in the ratio of VR to CFR; 
ΔWEDGEt-1 is the prior year’s change in WEDGE. All other variables are the changes in variables defined in Table 2. All 
models include an intercept, as well as year and Fama & French (1997) indicator variables. Test statistics and significance 
levels are calculated based on standard errors (Rogers) clustered at the firm level. Letters a, b, and c denote significance at 
the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively (two-sided tests); d denotes significance at the 10% level (one sided-test) for 
variables for which hypotheses are made. Coefficient estimates are multiplied by 1,000 for purposes of exposition. 
